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CRIMINAL LAW-THE HUSBAND'S RAPE EXEMPTION: AN EQUAL 
PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE-State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 
372 A.2d 386 (Essex County Ct. 1977). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Albert Smith defied a court order and went to his wife's 
apartment, broke down the door, and beat and raped her in the 
presence of their children. 1 He was charged with raping and as­
saulting his wife. In dismissing the rape charge, the New Jersey 
trial court rejected the state's contention that the rape statute2 
should be interpreted to allow prosecution of a husband for raping 
his wife when he engages in forcible intercourse without her con­
sent. Instead, the court followed the common law rule that a hus­
band cannot rape his wife, even though it disagreed with the 
policies and rationales behind the rule. This decision adds to the 
New Jersey rape statute a provision not included on the face of the 
statute. The added provision denies married women who are raped 
by their husbands equal protection under the law. 
The husband's exemption from criminal liability for raping his 
wife can be traced back to the reasoning of England's Sir Matthew 
Hale that the wife, by entering into the marriage contract, gave 
irrevocable consent to intercourse with her husband whenever he 
desired. 3 With few modifications, the rule that a husband cannot 
be prosecuted for raping his wife remains intact in England. 4 
l. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 306, 320 n.99 (1977). 
For purposes of this discussion, rape refers to sexual intercourse with a woman 
against her will and does not refer to the legal implications of the act. 
2. The statute provides: 

2A: 138-l. Rape and carnal abuse; penalty 

Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her 
will, or while she is under the influence of any narcotic drug, or who, being 
of the age of 16 or over, unlawfully and carnally abuses a woman-child 
under the age of 12 years, with or without her consent, is guilty of a h~gh 
misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by 
imprisonment for not more than 30 years, or both; or who, being of the age 
of 16 or over, unlawfully and carnally abuses a woman-child of the age of 12 
years or over, but under the age of 16 years, with or without her consent, is 
guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or both. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 138-1 (West 1969) (emphasis added). 
3. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed. 
1778), as cited in Note, supra note 1, at 307 n.12. 
4. A husband can be convicted for raping his wife when there has been a judi­
cial decree of separation, since the decree revokes the marital consent. Rex v. Clarke, 
[1949) 2 All E.R. 448. The mere filing for divorce, however, does not revoke the 
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United States courts have followed the basic English rule. No court 
has convicted a husband for raping his wife while the couple is still 
married and living together. 5 Some jurisdictions have gone so far as 
to hold that marriage is a valid defense to rape even when the 
couple is no longer living together. 6 Since a husband cannot be 
prosecuted for raping his wife, he cannot be prosecuted for the 
attempted rape of his wife. 7 As in England, a husband can only be 
convicted in connection with the rape of his wife when he aids, 
abets, or forces another man to have intercourse with his wife 
against her will. 8 
Legislatures have been more willing than courts to narrow the 
common law exemption. 9 Twenty-seven states include the hus­
band's exemption in their rape statutes. 10 Some states have mod­
ified the common law exemption by exempting the husband if the 
parties are separated by judicial decree. ll Other states deny the 
exemption if the parties are not living together and one of the 
spouses has filed for divorce or separation. 12 Still others exempt 
/
marital 'consent, even if the parties are not living together. Regina v. Miller, [1954] 2 
All Kil. 529. In addition, even Hale recognized that a husband can be convicted 
when he forces his wife to have intercourse with another man, English, The Hus­
band Who Rapes His Wife, 126 NEW L.J. 1223 (1976). In this situation, the husband 
is convicted for assisting in the rape, and not for the rape itself. Id. 
5. Note, supra note 1, at 321. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1017, 1019 
(1962). 
6. 	 Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857). 
7. 	 Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142,86 S.W. 754 (1905). 
8. Elliot v. State, 190 Ga. 803, 10 S.E.2d 843 (1940); State v. Martin, 17 N.C. 
App. 317, 194 S.K2d 60 (1973). Even if, in addition to aiding and abetting others to 
do so, the husband rapes his wife, his conviction rests on the aiding and abetting and 
not on the actual rape which he committed. State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 
1971). 
9. For an extensive classification of rape statutes, see Note, supra note 1, at 
317-19. 
10. Id. at 308. Illinois, for example, defines rape as follows: 

§ 11-1. Rape '/ I . 

(a) A male person of the age of 14 years and upwa'rds who has sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and against her will, com­
mits rape. Intercourse by force and against her will includes, but is not lim­
ited to any intercourse which occurs in the following situations: 
(1) 	 where the female is unconscious; or 
(2) 	 where the female is so mentally deranged or deficient that she can­
not give effective consent to intercourse. 
* * * * 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). 
11. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
27, § 464D (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1976). 
12. E.g., MINN. STAT. AN"I. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 
200.373 (1977). 
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the husband only if the couple is living together. 13 One state, Del­
aware, has completely abandoned the exemption. 14 Congress is 
also considering the marital rape exemption in the Criminal Code 
Reform Act,15 which was recently passed by the Senate. The Sen­
ate Committee on the Judiciary found "no legislative distinction 
between violent ravishment by strangers and less brutal schemes to 
take advantage of an initially consensual relationship. "16 
13. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Supp. 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
632-A:5 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-20 (1975). 
14. The statute now provides: "A male is guilty of rape in the second degree 
when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her con­
sent." DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1977). The statute had formerly read: "A male 
is guilty of rape when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female 
not his wife without her consent, or when he intentionally engages in sexual inter­
course with a male without such male's consent." DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 763 (1975) 
(amended 1974) (emphasis added). 
South Dakota, which had eliminated the exemption, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 
§ 22-22-1 (Supp. 1976), has reinstated it, providing: "Rape is an act of sexual penetra­
tion accomplished with any person other than the actor's spouse under anyone or 
more of the following circumstances...." S.D. COMPLIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 
(Special Supp. 1977). 
15. The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary states: 
Subsection (a) of section 1641 provides that a person is guilty of an offense if 
he engages in a sexual act and (1) compels the other person to participate in 
such act (A) by force, or (B) by threatening or placing the other person in 
fear that any person will immediately be subjected to death, serious bodily 
injury, or kidnapping, or (2) with intent to engage in a sexual act, has sub­
stantially impaired the ability of the other person to approve or control con­
duct by administering or employing a substance that he knows is a drug or 
intoxicant, or by other means, without the knowledge or against the will of 
the other person, or (3) the other person, is, in fact; less than twelve years 
old. 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 
1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1977). 
The Model Penal Code, however, includes the husband's exemption in its defi­
nition of rape: 
§ 213.1. Rape and Related Offenses 
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife 
is guilty of rape if: 
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent 
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted 
on anyone; or 
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control 
her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge 
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resis­
tance; or 
(c) the female is unconscious; or 
(d) the female is less than 10 years old. 
* * * * 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962). 
16. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT, S. 
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Commentators have espoused various rationales both in sup­
port of and in opposition to the husband's rape exemption. The 
earliest rationale used to support the husband's exemption was the 
implied consent doctrine as stated by Hale. 17 However, implied 
consent is a poor justification for protecting the husband from pros­
ecution, since it is unreasonable to infer from a woman's decision 
to marry that she intends to make her body accessible whenever 
the husband wants. IS 
Modem commentators who support the rule point first to 
problems of proof. Areas where such problems could arise include 
the wife's inability to recollect objectively at trial19 and the diffi­
culty presented in proving lack of consent. 20 However, problems of 
proof are easily exaggerated. 21 Similar problems exist in any rape 
prosecution and should not bar prosecution when the accused and 
victim are married. 22 Moreover, the major problem regarding rape 
today is the reluctance of victims to press charges, rather than prob­
lems of proof. 23 
Another argument advanced in support of the exemption is 
that reconciliation and marital harmony are fostered by barring 
prosecution. 24 To be sure, once the wife initiates a rape prosecu­
tion, there is little chance for the couple to make amends. Recon­
ciliation, however, is not a realistic justification unless some mat­
rimonial harmony remains in the relationship.25 If the parties are 
no longer concerned with the furtherance of the relationship, the 
wife should be protected from her husband. 26 
An additional reason used to support the exemption is the fear 
that the wife will threaten her husband with rape prosecution in 
REp. No. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1977). This is especially significant in light 
of the fact that only one state, Delaware, has acted so broadly. Hopefully, the future 
passage of this Act will encourage other states to change their law regarding the 
husband's exemption. 
17. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
18. 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1954). 
19. Id. at 725. 
20. Note, supra note 1, at 314; Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the 
Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 640-45 (1976). 
21. Note, supra note 1, at 314. 
22. Id.; English, supra note 4, at 1224. 
23. The stigma associated with rape, the reluctance to face embarassing insinu­
ations at trial, and the fear of retaliation by the defendant are some of the reasons 
why rape is one of the most underreported crimes. Note, supra note 1, at 315. 
24. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725. 
25. Note, supra note 1, at 315. 
26. English, supra note 4, at 1225. 
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order to force a favorable property settlement. 27 This fear, how­
ever, is unfounded and is inconsistent with the state's ability to 
convict the husband for other violent crimes including assault and 
sodomy, which are equally susceptible to contrivance. 28 
A final justification in support of the husband's exemption is 
that the rape laws should not apply to the husband because he 
does not threaten the community as much as the "ordinary" 
rapist. 29 Proponents of this argument believe that the wife is 
adequately protected by the assault and battery laws. 30 However, a 
woman suffers no less humiliation or fear from forcible rape by her 
husband than by another man. 31 Therefore, there is no reason to 
insulate the husband from criminal sanctions. 32 The argument that 
the husband is less of a threat to the community than the "ordi­
nary" rapist also fails because it is based on the outdated view that 
rape laws protect the husband's property interest in his wife. 33 
Under this view, the "husband-rapist" merely makes use of his own 
property34 while the community remains unaffected. However, this 
theory has long since ceased to reflect the present day approach to 
marriage as a relationship between equals. 35 The rape law should 
reflect this change and protect the woman's peace of mind and 
physical integrity. It should not exist to protect an anachronistic 
property interest. 36 
The problem of domestic violence furnishes another policy 
reason for abrogating the exemption. By allowing a husband total 
immunity for raping his wife, the law encourages acts of domestic 
violence. Considering the current magnitude of the domestic vio­
lence problem,37 legal policies regarding the marital relationship 
27. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725. 
28. Note, supra note 1, at 314. 
29. 6 STAN. L. REV., supra note 18, at 725. 
30. Id. at 726. 
31. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. 
REV. 919, 926 (1973). 
32. Id. Assault and battery law protection for the wife is inadequate. See also 
Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 135 (1977). In our system of law, the label and punishment for a crime 
should be appropriate and correspond to the actual crime committed. English, supra 
note 4, at 1225. 
33. Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
463, 472 (1975). 
34. Note, supra note 1, at 309. 
35. Note, supra note 33, at 472. 
36. Comment, supra note 31, at 924-25. 
37. Violence among all family members is widespread and increasing. Such 
violence is commonly inflicted by the husband on the wife. Owens, Battered Wives: 
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should discourage, not foster, domestic violence. 38 The husband's 
exemption illustrates the failure of the legal system to provide 
adequate recourse for the injured spouse. 39 The law is in effect 
condoning acts of marital violence. 
II. THE SMITH DECISION 
The court in State v. Smith distinguished itself from many 
courts by examining some of the policy considerations behind the 
husband's rape exemption. 4o The court recognized that Hale's 
implied consent rationale arose at a time when women were con­
sidered the property of the husband41 and when the role of the 
Some Social and Legal Problems, 2 BRIT. J.L. SOC'y 201 (1975). See generally 81 
DICK. L. REV. 815, 815 n.2 (1977). 
38. There have been various attempts to deal with domestic violence. In Ham­
mond City, Indiana, an experimental program places convicted violence-prone 
husbands on probation to their battered wives. The wives are sworn in as deputy 
probation officers. If the husbands cause any problems, probation is revoked and the 
husbands are incarcerated. In addition, husbands can serve their prison sentence on 
weekends to avoid losing their jobs. [1975-19761 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 283l. Eng­
land has enacted the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976). 
This Act gives the court injunctive power to restrain violent spouses from additional 
acts of violence or to exclude the violent spouse from the home. A power of arrest 
can also be attached to the injunction. [1976-197713 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 303l. 
These solutions might also be appropriate as alternatives to the husband's rape 
exemption in the situation where the parties are still living together and want to 
continue the relationship without the violent episodes. In this situation, recourse to 
the rape law is not an adequate remedy for the wife. If the husband is convicted, he 
will go to prison. This will disrupt the marital relationship at a time when the parties 
wish it to continue. However, under the alternatives discussed above, the couple is 
allowed to continue their relationship, if so desired, under the stipulation that the 
husband refrain from further acts of violence. See also Note, supra note 32. For a 
discussion of Massachusetts' approach to the problem of domestic violence, see 
McLellan, Massachusetts Divorce Practice and Procedure, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
277,321-24 n.191 (1978). 
39. Violence is not usually limited to one episode, but continues during the 
marital relationship. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS 
L.J. 259 (1971). Victims of domestic violence often have no legal recourse' because 
police often fail to intervene in family disputes. [1976-19771 3 FAM. L. REP: (BNA) 
2527. Accessibility to the courts is also a problem. [1976-197713 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 
2528. In Detroit, 4,900 women filed complaints of domestic violence against their hus­
bands, but only 300 actually went to court. Will, Brigham, & Ottenberg, Panel Work­
shop: violence, crime, sexual abuse and addiction, 5 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 385, 
394 (1976). See also note 24 supra. 
40. 148 N.J. Super. at 226-27, 372 A.2d at 390. Most courts apply the common 
law rule without exploring any rationales behind it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Landis, 129 Ky. 445, 112 S.W ..581 (1908); Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 
Gray) 489 (1857); State v. Faas, 39 N.J. Super. 306, 121 A.2d 69 (Essex County Ct. 
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 940 (1957); State V. Williamson, 22 Utah 248, 62 P. 1022 
(1900). 
4l. 148 N.J. Super. at 229, 372 A.2d at 39l. 
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husband was supreme in the marital relationship,42 The court 
observed that because rape is a crime which has a unique impact 
on the victim,43 a woman's right to sexual privacy should not be 
lost because of the legal fiction of consent arising from the mar­
riage contract. 44 The court noted that women's social status has 
changed over the years and that other areas of the law have re­
flected this change. 45 It also recognized that while an unmarried 
woman can withdraw consent to sexual intercourse after having 
previously consented, a married woman, under the traditional 
view, cannot withdraw the consent she has given by marriage, 46 
This results in discrimination against the wife rape victim. 47 Based 
on these considerations, the court concluded that giving the hus­
band a legally protected right to rape his wife ignores the reality of 
marital relationships in the twentieth century. 48 
Despite its strong reaction to this issue, the court felt com­
pelled to follow the common law rule. This decision was based 
primarily on certain rules of statutory construction. The court 
stated that since the rape statute49 originated from the common 
law, it must be construed strictly to avoid any asserted change. 50 
Additionally, since the statute makes no mention of the husband's 
exemption, the court relied on the axiom of construction that a 
penal statute must be construed strictly to prevent its application 
to persons or conduct beyond the contemplation of the legisla­
ture. 51 The court also took note of the proposed New Jersey Model 
42. [d. 
43. "Because of their uniquely personal and oftentimes violent nature, sex 
crimes, especially rape, are of great concern to our society. Whether young or old, 
the woman may suffer permanent emotional repercussions, and the psychological 
conspquences for the victim are impossible to calculate." [d. at 226, 372 A.2d at 390. 
44. [d. 
45. A close examination of the historical origins of [the husband's rape ex­
emption] reveal[sl that it is rooted in the ancient concepts of a wife as a 
chattel and the inviolability of the husband's supreme role in a marriage rela­
tionship. While such concepts standing alone have long since disappeared, 
American courts in their mechanistic application of this principle have failed 
to come to grips with the changes that have occurred in the status of a wife 
since the 17th century. In other areas modern jurisprudence has consistent­
ly refused to permit such male dominated concepts to stand in the way.... 




49. See note 2 supra. 
50. 148 N.J. Super. at 230-31, 372 A.2d at 392. 
51. [d. 
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Penal Code provision52 which would apply the exemption except 
when rape is committed between spouses "living apart in a state of 
separation. "53 
The Smith decision is commendable because the court exam­
ined the policies behind the exemption. However, while its choice 
of rules of construction was clearly correct, all of the rules relied on 
can give way in appropriate circumstances. Regarding the rule of 
construing statutes to avoid the asserted change,54 at least one 
court has said that old common law doctrines can hardly give reli­
able guidance today in the interpretation of a statute promulgated 
at a time when individual and social values were vastly different. 55 
That court construed a mayhem statute to be more inclusive than it 
had been at common law. Under this analysis, the Smith court 
could have included the husband within the class of persons 
punishable under the rape statute. 56 
The Smith court's reliance on the rule of construing statutes 
narrowly and ,in favor of the defendant must be analyzed in light of 
the reason for the rule. This rule of construction is grounded in the 
constitutionally-created vagueness doctrine57 and is based on the 
52. [d. at 232, 372 A.2d at 392-93. 
53. [d. The Senate Judiciary Committee is debating the New Jersey Penal 
Code provision regarding the rape of one's spouse. It appears that the present state 
of the law on this issue will prevail. Letter received from John DeCicco, 1st Assis­
tant, Appellate Section, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 
Division of Criminal Justice by author (12/18/77). This letter is on file in the Western 
New England Law Review office. 
54. For a discussion of this rule of construction, see 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01 (4th ed. 1973). 
55. United States v. Cook, 462 F.2d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The defendant 
threw lye into Pelzer's eyes. He was charged with and convicted of mayhem under 
D.C. CODE § 22-506 (1967). The defendant contended that since he didn't totally 
destroy Pelzer's eyesight and no permanent injury was caused, he had not committed 
the offense charged. The court refused to interpret the statute solely in light of the 
common law which focused on the reduction of the victim's combat ability. The 
court stated that the focus of the statute is on the integrity of the person. 
56. An additional policy consideration for disregarding the exemption urges 
that when the reason for any common law rule ceases, the rule should be discarded. 
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 266, 270 (1974). This rule comports with the notion that courts 
should not function mechanically, but rather should apply the statute in an intelli­
gent, reasoned manner that makes sense as a part of the whole body of law. Ker­
nochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 345 
(1976). The Smith court applied the exemption in too mechanistic a fashion. Indeed, 
the court itself stated that the rule makes no sense in today's society. 
57. The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle 
is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he 
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idea that the legislature owes a duty to its citizens to give fair 
warning of prohibited acts58 by making unmistakably clear those 
acts for which a citizen may lose life or liberty. 59 It protects the 
individual against the arbitrary discretion of officials and judges. 60 
However, the argument that a prosecution of the husband fails to 
give the defendant adequate warning as to punishable conduct is 
not persuasive here because the statute61 clearly indicates the type 
of conduct proscribed, without reference to marital status. A hus­
band who rapes his wife knows he is having intercourse with a 
woman against her will, and cannot rely on the language of the 
statute to claim that his conduct is not forbidden. The statute 
clearly states what constitutes the crime of rape and makes plain to 
all persons that such conduct will be punished. 62 \ 
Additionally, this rule of construction is not the only factor to 
consider when interpreting a statute63 and is not mandatory in its 
application. 64 New Jersey courts have recognized that this rule 
does not prevent a court from reading a penal statute in relation to 
the evil to be suppressed. 65 The rape statute seeks to prevent or 
punish the violation of a woman's sexual privacy by any person. 66 
Accordingly, the Smith court could have properly construed the 
statute to exclude the husband's exemption. 
could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953) (footnote omitted). 
58. "The essential purpose of the 'void for vagueness' doctrine is to warn indi­
viduals of the criminal consequences of their conduct." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 
U.S. 223, 230 (1951). 
59. "A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the re­
quired conduct to one who would avoid its penalties...." Boyce Motor Lines v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). See 3 C. SANDS, supra note 54, § 59.03 (1974). 
60. State v. Woodruff, 68 N.J.L. 89, 52 A. 294 (1902); 3 C. SANDS, supra note 
54, § 59.03 (1974). 
61. See note 2 supra. 
62. No more than a reasonable degree of certainty is demanded of a criminal 
statute. One whose acts are deliberately close to the area of proscribed conduct risks 
crossing the line. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). 
63. 3 C. SANDS, supra note 54, § 59.06 (1974). 
64. Kernochan, supra note 56, at 357. 
65. "The rule of strict construction does not prevent a court from reading the 
statute in relation to the evil or mischief to be suppressed, ... or prevent a court 
from giving effect to the terms of a statute in accordance with their fair and natural 
acceptation." State v. Oneida Motor Freight, 27 N.J. Super. 125, 129, 98 A.2d 594, 
596 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1953) (quoting State v. Gratale Bros., 26 N.]. Super. 581, 
98 A.2d 591 (1953) (Goldman, J.)). 
66. Comment, supra note 31; Comment, Washington's Attempt to View Sexual 
Assault as More than a "Violation" of the Moral Woman-The Revision of the Rape 
Laws, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1975). 
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More important, the Smith court was constitutionally man­
dated to make such a construction. 67 New Jersey courts have of 
course recognized that the judiciary must interpret and apply stat­
utes within constitutional limits. 68 Serious constitutional infirmities 
result from the inclusion of the husband's exemption in any rape 
law because the exemption denies married women who are raped 
by their husbands equal protection of the law. 69 
67. See generally Hintenberger v. City of Garfield, 49 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 139 
A.2d 328, 331 (Super. Ct. Law Div.), afi'd, 52 N.J. Super. 526, 146 A.2d 123 (Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1958); Gaylord, An Approach to Statutory Construction, 5 Sw. V.L. 
REv. 349, 375 (1974). 
68. Hintenberger v. City of Garfield, 49 N.J. Super. 175, 179, 139 A.2d 328, 331 
(Super. Ct. Law Div.), afI'd, 52 N.J. Super. 526, 146 A.2d 123 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1958). 
69. While equal protection challenges to criminal statutes are usually made by 
the defendant, the marital rape exemption is a situation where equal protection con­
siderations should be viewed from the victim's perspective. Nearly half of the juris­
dictions in the United States have recognized victim's rights through state-funded 
programs to compensate victims of violent crimes. Harland, Compensating the Vic­
tims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203, 204 (1978). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
52:4B-1O to 4B-11 (West Supp. 1978) which reads as follows: 
52:4B-IO. Persons entitled to compensation; order 
In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act or omission 
of any other person which is within the description of the offenses listed in 
section 11 of this act, the board may, upon application and the concurrence 
of a majority of the members thereof, order the payment of compensation in 
accordance with the provisions of this act: 
a. to or on behalf of the victim, 
b. in the case of the personal injury of the victim, where the compensa­
tion is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person re­
sponsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person, or 
c. in the case of the death of the victim, to or for the benefit of the 
dependents of the deceased victim, or anyone or more of such dependents. 
* * * * 
52:4B-l1. Causes of personal injury or death 
The board may order the payment of compensation in accordance with 
the provisions of this act for personal injury or death which resulted from: 
(a) an attempt to prevent the commission of crime or to arrest a sus­
pected criminal or in aiding or attempting to aid a police officer so to do, or 
(b) the commission or attempt to commit any of the following offenses: 
1. assault constituting a high misdemeanor; 
2. mayhem; 
3. threats to do bodily harm; 
4. lewd, indecent, or obscene acts; 





10. any other crime involving violence. 
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Equal protection infirmities regarding the husband's rape ex­
emption have been suggested elsewhere. For example, prior to the 
passage of the Michigan Sexual Assault Act,70 the state legislature 
discussed the equal protection ramifications of the husband's rape 
exemption. The proposed act differentiated between married 
couples living apart and those living together. Opponents of this 
differentiation claimed that it resulted in a denial of equal protec­
tion because only married couples who are living apart are pro­
tected under the law.71 A recent note on the marital rape exemp­
tion72 also suggested constitutional problems with the rule by stat­
ing that "it deprives an entire class of women the protection of 
rape statutes. "73 
The Smith court itself hinted at the constitutional deficiency of 
the exemption when it stated that "the law discriminates against 
the wife rape victim. "74 In discussing why the exemption should be 
eliminated, the court added, "In other areas modern jurisprudence 
has consistently refused to permit such male dominated concepts to 
(Footnote omitted). The purpose of this statute is to provide some measure of com­
pensation to innocent victims of crimes in certain cases. In re Carr, 136 N.J. Super. 
344,346,346 A.2d 406, 407 (1975). 
These statutes attempt to fulfill the state's duty to protect its citizens. Since the 
victim has been injured, the state has failed in this duty and should compensate the 
victim. McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in America, 
11 URB. LAW. 346, 349 (1976). Another rationale views compensation as a right of the 
victim. Harland, supra at 206. 
Most jurisdictions, however, deny recovery to victims whose injuries were in­
flicted by family members because of the ease of fabrication. McAdam, supra at 36l. 
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1978) which provides that "[n]o 
compensation shall be awarded if the victim ... is a relative of the offender...." 
Therefore, a wife who is victimized by her husband's violent outburst is denied any 
compensation. If raped, she is also denied the enforcement of the rape statute. Equal 
protection analysis is an alternative which affords the victim the enforcement of the 
criminal statute. Construing a criminal statute from the victim's perspective furthers 
the modern trend of recognizing victims' rights. 
70. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.S20a-l (1978). 
7l. Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 
233 (1974). Despite the opposition to the distinction, it was upheld. 
The Michigan exemption was also attacked in the case of People v. Hartwell, No. 
75-091591-FM (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. Mar. 16, 1976). Here, the defendant 
was acquitted of murdering her husband by claiming self defense from a sexual at­
tack. The defense contended that the husband's exemption for couples living to­
gether was a denial of equal protection. Note, supra note I, at 32l. The court, how­
ever, did not rule on the constitutionality of the statute. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. [d. at 323. 
74. 148 N.]. Super. at 228,372 A.2d at 39l. 
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stand in the way of equal protection of the laws. The instant case 
should be no exception. "75 
III. AN EQUAL PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE 
The first step in examining the constitutional infirmities of the 
husband's rape exemption is to determine whether the state has 
the power under the constitution to punish the husband for a sex­
ual act within the marital relationship. One reading of the cases of 
Griswold v. Connecticut76 and Eisenstadt v. Baird77 would forbid 
the state from interfering with the private sexual behavior of mar­
ried adults. 78 However, the privacy of marital sex is not immune 
from governmental interference where there is a compelling state 
interest. 79 At least one court has stated that a state has a compel­
ling interest in protecting its citizens from violence, including non­
consensual sexual conduct, even if the parties are married to each 
other. 80 Since marital rape is clearly nonconsensual sexual conduct, 
there was an available analysis enabling the Smith court to hold 
that the Constitution permits a state to prosecute a husband for 
raping his wife. Additionally, Eisenstadt indicated that the right of 
privacy attaches to the individual. 81 Therefore, the fact that a mar­
riage exists does not automatically bar any government interven­
tion. 
Equal protection requires that state legislation which places 
persons in different classes for disparate treatment be based on 
criteria reasonably related to a legitimate objective of the legisla­
tion. 82 In order to determine the standard of review that a court 
should apply in determining whether a statute violates equal pro­
75. Id. 
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
78. Once the state authorizes marriage, it lacks power to intrude on the privacy 
right inherent in the marital relationship. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
79. See generally 381 U.S. at 485-86; see also id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., con­
curring). 
80. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110,547 P.2d 6, 9 (1976). 
81. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity, with a mind and 
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 
405 U.S. at 453. 
82. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). 
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tection, the basis of the classification must be examined. The 
classification formed by the husband's rape exemption is based on 
marital status. 83 Rape victims are treated differently if the rapist 
was the victim's husband. The husband enjoys a special immunity 
he did not have before the marriage; the wife is denied the protec­
tion of a law she enjoyed before her marriage. Thus, the status of 
both parties under the rape law changes the moment they are mar­
ried. Ordinarily, only a rational basis is needed to support a 
classification based on marital status. 84 However, since the rape 
exemption infringes on the fundamental right of personal privacy, a 
compelling state interest must be shown to sustain the classifica­
tion. 85 
Cases dealing with the issue of a woman's right to an abortion 
illustrate that a woman has a fundamental right of personal privacy 
in deciding matters relating to her body. In Roe v. Wade,86 the 
Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of a Texas criminal 
abortion lawB7 which proscribed the procurement of, or attempt to 
procure, an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of 
saving the mother's life. 88 The Court stated that the fundamental 
right of personal privacy exists under the Constitution89 and that 
83. The marital rape exemption is not a sex-based classification. Marital status, 
not sex, is the critical distinction involved in the husband's exemption. This issue is 
beyond the scope of this note. 
84. "Under 'traditional' equal protection analysis, a legislative classification 
must be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to 
a legitimate governmental interest." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 
(1973). 
85. This test is used when a classification is based on race, alienage, or natural 
origin. ld. at 682. It is also used when a fundamental right is involved. Such rights 
may include activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela­
tionships, child rearing, and education. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972). 
See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text. 
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
87. 	 The statute proVided: 

Article 1191. Abortion. 

If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or know­
ingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or 
shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or inter­
nally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the 
penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without 
her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is meant that 
the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or 
that a premature birth thereof be caused. 
ld. at 117 n.!. 
88. ld. 	at 117-18. 
89. ld. at 152. 
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state interference with this right can only be justified by a compel­
ling state interest. 90 
The same fundamental right of privacy at issue in Roe is at 
issue in the rape exemption. In abortion, the issue is whether a 
woman has the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. In rape 
cases, the husband's exemption focuses on the woman's right to 
avoid unwanted intercourse. Both cases tum on the right of a 
woman to control her own body. 
This right was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis­
souri v. Danforth91 in the context of a constitutional challenge to 
provisions of the Missouri abortion statute. One provision required 
the written consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion 
during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. The Court held the 
spousal consent provision unconstitutional, stating "the State can­
not 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is 
absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first 
trimester of pregnancy.' "92 Thus, the Court defined the woman's 
right of privacy to be beyond her husband's control. 
While these cases were decided on due process grounds, and 
are not directly applicable as such to the marital rape exemption, 93 
90. [d. at 155. The court then balanced the state's interest in protecting potential 
life and safeguarding the public health with the woman's personal right of privacy. 
The court concluded that a state criminal abortion law which excepted from criminal­
ity only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of 
the pregnancy and other interests involved violated the due process clause of the 
Constitution. [d. at 164. 
9l. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
92. [d. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F. 
Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)). 
This result is consistent with lower federal court decisions. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1975), which involved a constitutional chal­
lenge to provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required the 
husband's consent prior to the performance of an abortion. The court held this to be 
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process because the husband's consent re­
quirement failed to give any recognition to the mother's fundamental, though qual­
ified, right to have an abortion. The woman's right to an abortion is not absolute, 
because at some point during the pregnancy, the state's interest in protecting the po­
tentiallife of the fetus outweighs the mother's privacy right. 410 U.S. at 154. 
93. The major distinction between the abortion cases and the rape exemption is 
state action. While abortion statutes directly prohibit women from obtaining an abor­
tion and, therefore, infringe on the woman's right of personal privacy, see note 
87 supra, the husband's rape exemption results in an indirect infringement. The 
husband-rapist directly violates his wife's right of privacy. The state is prohibiting 
the enforcement of a law which protects this right for the class of women who are 
raped by someone other than their husband. Whether this action by the state is suffi­
cient to attack the rape exemption on due process grounds is beyond the scope of 
this note. 
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they illustrate the fundamental importance of a woman's right of 
personal privacy. Since the husband's rape exemption vitiates this 
fundamental right of privacy, the state must show a compelling 
interest in order to sustain the exemption. 
Cases involving marital classifications in the school environ­
ment further illustrate the difficulty in sustaining a marital classifi­
cation which affects a fundamental right. In Holt v. Shelton,94 a 
school regulation prohibited married students from participating in 
activities and functions except for classes in subjects for which 
graduation credits were given. The court held the school board's 
interest in discouraging high school marriages an insufficient justifi­
cation for the infringement on the student's fundamental right to 
marry. In Hollon v. Mathis Independent School District,95 the 
school board's concern with an increasing dropout rate was also 
held to be an insufficient justification to support a regulation which 
prohibited any married student from participating in interscholastic 
league athletic activities. 96 
In other areas of the law, classifications based on marital status97 
94. 341 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. Tenn. 1972). 
95. 358 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1973), vacated as moot, 491 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1974). See also Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Davis v. 
Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972). 
96. The denial of rights and privileges in the school context is a clear infringe­
ment of the students' rights to marry and to be educated. In the rape context, the 
denial is less obvious. In parallel fashion, however, the husband's rape exemption 
results in a denial of a right the woman would have had if she had remained single. 
97. One such example where a classification based on marital status is no 
longer applied is the area of credit. Previously, when a single woman with credit 
married, her credit status was automatically shifted into the risk category. Her credit 
was re-evaluated and based primarily on her husband's credit criteria. Additionally, 
all credit information was filed under her husband's name. Thus, the wife could 
build no credit standing, and her husband's credit delinquency record was also at­
tributed to her. Comment, Women and Credit, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 863, 866 (1974). 
Congress rectified this conclusive presumption when it enacted the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. 1978). The Act provides: "(a) It shall be 
unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any 
aspect of a credit transaction-(I) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract) 
...." Id. (emphasis added). . 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), is an example of a case in which a statute 
created a classification forming a conclusive presumption regarding marital status. In 
Stanley, an Illinois statute provided that children of unmarried fathers, upon death 
of the mother, became wards of the state, without any hearing on parental fitness. How­
ever, hearings and proof of unfitness were required before the state assumed custody 
of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers. Thus, the statute 
created the irrebuttable presumption that when the mother is dead the unwed father 
is an unfit parent. This presumption did not apply to a married father whose wife 
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have been attacked on equal protection grounds. One example in­
volves an attack on sodomy statutes. In People v. Johnson,98 a 
sodomy statute criminalized certain sexual acts when the parties 
were not married to each other.99 The court dismissed the informa­
tion against the defendant, stating that, because the marital status 
distinction is an unsupportable basis for the classification, the stat­
ute denies equal protection of the law to citizens not married to 
each other.loo The court acted similarly in People v. Rice lol when 
faced with a constitutional attack on the same sodomy statute. The 
court could find no rational basis for distinguishing between mar­
ried and unmarried people regarding consensual sexual actS. 102 The 
court dismissed the charge, concluding that since regulation of a 
married person's sexual conduct invades the right of privacy, under 
Griswold, regulation of a single person's sexual conduct equally 
violates the right to privacy. loa Therefore, a statute prohibiting cer­
tain sexual conduct of only unmarried persons denies equal protec­
tion. 104 
had died. The Supreme Court held this irrebuttable presumption of unfitness an 
unconstitutional deprivation of due process and equal protection. Parental fitness 
must be established on an individual level. 
The husband's rape exemption creates an analogous situation, state action being 
the major point of distinction. The rape statute defines rape as "carnal knowledge of 
a woman forcibly against her will." See note 2 supra. Since the wife cannot prose­
,cute, this creates the presumption that carnal knowledge of a wife is never forcible 
and against her will, without giving the wife an opportunity to show otherwise. This 
result brings one back to Hale's implied consent rationale, which supporters of the 
exemption have regarded as a poor justification for the rule. See notes 17-18 supra 
and accompanying text. 
For cases involVing irrebuttable presumptions in other contexts, see Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. 
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
98. 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (City Ct. Buffalo 1974). 
99. The New York statute provides: "A person is guilty of consensual sodomy 
when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person." N.Y. PENAL 
LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1975). 
"[Dleviate sexual intercourse means sexual conduct between persons not married 
to each other consisting of contact between the penis and anus, the mouth and penis 
or the mouth and vulva...." Id. § 130.00. 
100. 77 Misc. 2d at 891, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 267. 
101. 80 Misc. 2d 5Il, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1975), rev'd, 
41 N.Y.2d 1018, 395 N.Y.S.2d 626, 363 N.E.2d 1371 (1977). 
102. Id. at 514, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 488. 
103. Although the dismissal of the charge was reversed on appeal, the court did 
not rule that the constitutional argument was without merit. The court would not 
determine constitutional issues with respect to the sodomy statute from nonfinal or­
ders. It said instead that such issues would require a review on the merits when and 
if the defendants were convicted. People v. Rice, 41 N.Y.2d 1018, 395 N.Y.S.2d 
626,363 N.E.2d 1371 (1977). 
104. 80 Misc. 2d at 516, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 489. Courts elsewhere have been re­
ceptive to equal protection attacks on sodomy statutes which classified according to 
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This analysis applies directly to the husband's rape exemption. 
The sole distinction is that in the rape context the acts are not 
consensual, as in the sodomy statutes above. This distinction, how­
ever, lends support to the application of this analysis to the rape 
exemption. Since rape is nonconsensual and far more violent than 
consensual sodomy, there is a greater need to give all women the 
protection of the law. In view of the fact that the court has the 
power to reach both married and unmarried people engaged in 
nonconsens'ual acts,105 the state's decision to criminalize one class 
and not the other violates the equal protection clause unless there 
is a sufficient state interest in maintaining the distinction. Since the 
rape exemption infringes the wife's fundamental right,106 the state 
must show a compelling interest in making the attempted rape 
classification. There are no such compelling interests in the justifi­
cations behind the husband's exemption. 
marital status, In State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (1975), rev'd, 89 N.M. 
305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976), the sodomy statute in question regulated the sexual rela­
tions of any adult, regardless of marital status and consent. The statute provided: 
Sodomy consists of a person intentionally taking into his or her mouth or 
anus the sexual organ of any other person or animal or intentionally placing 
his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal, 
or coitus with an animal. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to 
complete the crime of sodomy. Both parties may be principals. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-6 (repealed Supp. 1975). The court realized that under 
Griswold and Eisenstadt married couples are constitutionally protected from gov­
ernmental interference with their consensual sexual relations. 88 N.M. at 193, 539 
P.2d at 213. The court then extended the marital privacy right of Griswold to unmar­
ried people engaged in consensual sexual acts, stating that to apply the law other­
wise would be a violation of equal protection. Id. 
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the holding that the statute 
was unconstitutional. The basis of this reversal was the refusal of the court to extend 
the Griswold decision beyond married couples. State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 
P.2d 1352 (1976). 
A New Jersey court has held that its sodomy statute does not violate equal pro­
tection. The statute does not prohibit certain conduct of married couples. At the 
same time, the statute does not recognize the right of consenting unmarried couples 
to practice the same consensual conduct. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 
(1973). The reason for this holding was the court's reluctance to extend the Griswold 
right of privacy to unmarried consenting adults. Id. at 396-97, 301 A.2d at 753. 
These courts found that no denial of equal protection results when the right of 
privacy, as interpreted in Griswold, is limited to married couples. Therefore, the 
state is not applying the statute arbitrarily to different classes of people. Rather, the 
state has the power to regulate only one of the classes. In either case, this reversal 
does not affect the application of these principles to the marital rape exemption. In 
the rape context, there is no issue of marital privacy under Griswold. Therefore, the 
Griswold decision is a stumbling block only to an equal protection analysis of con­
sensual conduct, and not to an analysis of the marital rape exemption. 
105. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. 
106. See notes 86-92 supra and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The husband's rape exemption violates the equal protection 
clause because there is no justification sufficient to uphold the in­
fringement on the woman's right of personal privacy. The implied 
consent justification has even been discounted by supporters of the 
exemption. 107 Problems of prooP08 and fear of coercive claims109 
both center on the inconvenience to the state in permitting the 
prosecution. However, administrative convenience should not jus­
tify an infringement of a fundamental right. 110 Reconciliation and 
promotion of marital harmony111 are certainly legitimate govern­
mental interests, but the exemption does not operate to further these 
interests. 112 On the contrary, the enforcement of the rape law 
against the husband would promote marital tranquility. Spouses 
would be encouraged to work out their marital problems within the 
framework of the law, and would not be allowed to engage in con­
duct which is clearly illegal. 113 
The Smith court had alternative methods of statutory construc­
tion to exclude the husband's rape exemption from the New Jersey 
statute. On its face, the statute did not exempt the husband. The 
court could have given the statute its plain meaning by ignoring 
the common law exemption. However, the court, while feeling 
compelled to recognize the common law, could have eliminated the 
exemption by considering the equal protection ramifications of in­
cluding this additional term. By subjecting the rape exemption to 
an equal protection analysis, the court could have brought the rape 
law into line with other areas of the law which have ceased to 
classify solely on the basis of marital status. Moreover, by adopting 
this approach, the court could have set the constitutional parame­
ters for the legislature in its reformation of the rape law. 114 Most 
107. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. 
108. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text. 
109. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. 

1l0. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). 

llI. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 

112. See note 25-26 supra and accompanying text. 
113. See Scutt, Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage Contract, 3 
MONASH L. REV. 255, 272 (1977). "[Plublic policy ... surely ought not to support 
what in effect are criminal acts committed against the person, which can hardly be 
calculated to inspire, maintain, or preserve a happily married relationship." [d. 
114. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text. The court can encroach on 
the legislative sphere where there is a constitutional violation. Maule v. Conduit and 
Foundation Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 488,494, 307 A.2d 651, 655 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1973). 
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important, the court could have ended the unconstitutional infringe­
ment on a married woman's right of personal privacy by granting to 
her the equal protection of the rape law. 
Stuart M. Litoff 
